Anne Lauvergeon, CEO of AREVA

Anne Lauvergeon is CEO of AREVA. This speech was given at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 2009 Conference on Nonproliferation in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 2009. Previously: Part I

Of course, the responsibility for ensuring an effective regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons rests first and foremost with governments. States ensure that the Nonproliferation Treaty and the related bilateral and multilateral arrangements and regimes are respected and enforced by the involved stakeholders. But nuclear industry also have to play a major role in implementing those rules.

And it does play this role. Let me give you the example of what it concretely means for a company like AREVA. AREVA’s “Value Charter” establishes nonproliferation at the top of its operating principles:

• AREVA manages all its nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in full accord with all international nonproliferation treaties, norms and national regulations.
• AREVA does not, and will never, cooperate with any customer from a country that does not adhere to international nonproliferation norms or is in noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations.
• Even if a country satisfies the above criteria, we reserve the right to assess any particular commercial transaction in terms of its effect on nonproliferation rules and regional and international stability.
• AREVA implements its own rigorous export control process for all end-user countries, which includes special training for AREVA employees who implement this program.
• As for sensitive technologies, such as enrichment and reprocessing (or recycling), let me be clear about them. We exercise special care in considering the transfer to other countries. As far as recycling technology transfer is concerned, we have transferred it to Japan, provided Japan committed not to retransfer this technology to any other country. We are currently considering transferring the recycling technology without any separation of plutonium to China, and we will transfer it to the United States if they choose to. To sum it up, Japan, maybe China and the United States, and that’s all! Full stop!

To share and always improve our practice, we also participate in numerous international initiatives, committees and institutions that seek to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. And at first with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is the very reason why I joined the IAEA Committee 2020 set up in 2008 by Mohamed El Baradei. I believe indeed that industry has a role here to support and strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and its core actor such as IAEA. I am also currently working with the ‘International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament’ chaired by Garreth Evans and Yuriko Kawaguchi. In my view, participating in such committees is neither about prestige, nor about giving a label of good behaviour to nuclear industry. No, it is about partnering and sharing, sharing our ground experience in safeguards, in physical protection and other technical aspects of the nonproliferation field.

It is also about sharing how we see the nuclear market evolving. Let me insist on that point: potential AREVA customers are not interested in enrichment or recycling facilities. They are interested in the generation of clean and affordable power. Why? Because the era of prestige is over: most countries have now entered an era of realism and efficiency. They have an equation to solve: how to generate X thousands MWh for 2020 or 2025 in a competitive, sustainable, and responsible way. And nuclear electricity generation is one of the solutions. You may wonder: and what if those countries ask for sensitive technology transfers? Well, the answer is simple: we won’t sell it!

Why do some countries seek nuclear weapons? National security, national power, prestige: their motivations are political. That is why apparent weapons programs have existed in some countries that have never produced a single KWh with nuclear generation – North Korea, Iraq, Iran come to mind.

The countries that come and see AREVA are not at all in this mindset. In fact, almost all countries we meet show zero interest in acquiring sensitive nuclear technology such as highly sophisticated uranium enrichment and/or used fuel treatment capability. As light water reactors such as AREVA’s EPR reactor by themselves do not present a proliferation risk, that’s why I am confident to say that the international growth of nuclear electricity generation does not equate to proliferation risk.

Anne Lauvergeon, CEO of AREVA

Anne Lauvergeon is CEO of AREVA. This speech was given at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 2009 Conference on Nonproliferation in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 2009. This is Part I of her speech; we’ll be posting more in the upcoming days.

Dear Jessica Matthews, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I heard President Obama’s remarkable speech in Prague yesterday. It reminded me of this sentence of the German philosopher Hegel: “Human beings make history but they are not aware of which history they are making.” Well, yesterday, I had the feeling that President Obama and us are aware of the history we are willing to make, the history of a safer, more prosperous, and more equitable world.

It is of course first and foremost the responsibility of States to ensure a peaceful and prosperous world. But it is also the responsibility of non-governmental actors to dedicate all their efforts to help building this world: experts, researchers, think tanks, and corporate business.

That’s why I want to convey my deepest thanks to the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, and to its President, Jessica Mathews, for giving me the opportunity to express today the view of an industrial actor on non-proliferation.

Actually, I feel both impressed and honoured to be invited to give a speech at this prestigious Conference.

Firstly, because of the fame of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Secondly, because I feel very much the honour of talking as a representative of the industry to all of you, who represent the world nonproliferation community. Let’s be frank: we belong to two worlds that have not sufficiently spoken together. Thanks to the action of such organizations as Carnegie, but also thanks of the transparency and openness of a nuclear company like AREVA, bridges have been created, and a fruitful dialogue has been set up.

It was high time we found ways to talk to each other. With the nuclear renaissance, we indeed have a unique opportunity to promote an enhanced culture of non-proliferation. Because this is my conviction: whatever you call it – renaissance, rebirth, renewed interest, come-back… the fact is that we witness a worldwide enthusiasm for nuclear energy, coming from Governments, utilities or electro-intensive industries, with which we have to deal with in a responsible way. Our shared interests – the industry’s ones, but also the governments’ and the community of experts’ ones – are at stake.

We have to deal with it because there is neither craze nor any fashionable trend in this renewed interest in nuclear energy, but rational and well-grounded reasons. Energy lies indeed at the heart of the challenges the world must address, and sustainability, competitiveness, and security are the three angles of the energy triangle.

Few sources of energy can meet these three requirements.

Fossil fuels, with their substantial greenhouse gas emissions, cannot meet the sustainability requirement.

Even if they have to be developed, most of the renewable sources of energy provide only intermittent energy and cannot by themselves ensure full security of supply. Moreover, they don’t meet the competitiveness requirement as well, needing heavy subsidies in the USA as well as in Europe. It is not shocking to subsidize a source of energy at the early stage of its development but we have to be aware of it.

Nuclear energy does meet all three requirements of sustainability, competitiveness and security. Nuclear energy is indeed:

Carbon-free and sustainable, because it emits the lowest amount of carbon per KWhe among all sources of energy,

Competitive, even without a carbon pricing system. That is why it is the choice of countries with highly regulated economic systems (China, India), partially deregulated ones such as the United States of America, or totally deregulated economies like in the United Kingdom,

Secure, because uranium is widely available around the world – current major mines are in politically stable countries, such as Canada and Australia,

And conventional resources account for 200 times the annual demand. In addition, the global nuclear fuel market is functioning effectively, and consumer states are able to obtain satisfactory assurances of supply through long-term contracts. For example, in AREVA, we have signed a contract with a customer for 60 years!

The ability of nuclear power to meet these requirements explains the growing global interest in nuclear energy. However, the prospects for an expansion in nuclear energy also come with concerns in some quarters that the spread of this technology could contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons either to additional states or to nonstate actors such as terrorist groups.

I came here today because my conviction, and my experience, is that the nuclear renaissance does not put the non-proliferation regime at risk. The international growth of nuclear electricity generation does not equate – and should not be equated – to increasing proliferation risk.

Should I recall that the vast majority of states, I would even say nearly all the States with the exception of few, have made commitments to forego the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons and have abided by those obligations? I believe it fair to state that the nonproliferation regime has been very successful in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.

Of course, we all have in mind the proliferation crisis this regime had and still have to go through: Iran, North Korea, the A.Q. Khan network. If I mention those crises, it is because I want to be very clear on one point. I am not stating that everything works perfectly and that the non-proliferation regime as it exists is a panacea. No one doubts indeed that responsible members of the international community must be ever vigilant, and must accelerate their efforts to tighten the nonproliferation regime and to strengthen international safeguards, nuclear export controls, physical protection and other elements of the regime. And this is why the non-proliferation policy exposed yesterday by President Obama comes as a relief and a hope for all of us who are aware of the weak points of the non-proliferation regime.

However, the proliferation challenges mentioned above do not cast doubt on the effectiveness of the nonproliferation system as a whole! Nor do they justify the conclusion that the growth of civil nuclear power programs means the spread of nuclear weapons!