Anne Lauvergeon, CEO of AREVA

Anne Lauvergeon is CEO of AREVA. This speech was given at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s 2009 Conference on Nonproliferation in Washington, D.C. on April 6, 2009. Previously: Part I

Of course, the responsibility for ensuring an effective regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons rests first and foremost with governments. States ensure that the Nonproliferation Treaty and the related bilateral and multilateral arrangements and regimes are respected and enforced by the involved stakeholders. But nuclear industry also have to play a major role in implementing those rules.

And it does play this role. Let me give you the example of what it concretely means for a company like AREVA. AREVA’s “Value Charter” establishes nonproliferation at the top of its operating principles:

• AREVA manages all its nuclear facilities and nuclear materials in full accord with all international nonproliferation treaties, norms and national regulations.
• AREVA does not, and will never, cooperate with any customer from a country that does not adhere to international nonproliferation norms or is in noncompliance with its nonproliferation obligations.
• Even if a country satisfies the above criteria, we reserve the right to assess any particular commercial transaction in terms of its effect on nonproliferation rules and regional and international stability.
• AREVA implements its own rigorous export control process for all end-user countries, which includes special training for AREVA employees who implement this program.
• As for sensitive technologies, such as enrichment and reprocessing (or recycling), let me be clear about them. We exercise special care in considering the transfer to other countries. As far as recycling technology transfer is concerned, we have transferred it to Japan, provided Japan committed not to retransfer this technology to any other country. We are currently considering transferring the recycling technology without any separation of plutonium to China, and we will transfer it to the United States if they choose to. To sum it up, Japan, maybe China and the United States, and that’s all! Full stop!

To share and always improve our practice, we also participate in numerous international initiatives, committees and institutions that seek to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. And at first with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It is the very reason why I joined the IAEA Committee 2020 set up in 2008 by Mohamed El Baradei. I believe indeed that industry has a role here to support and strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and its core actor such as IAEA. I am also currently working with the ‘International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament’ chaired by Garreth Evans and Yuriko Kawaguchi. In my view, participating in such committees is neither about prestige, nor about giving a label of good behaviour to nuclear industry. No, it is about partnering and sharing, sharing our ground experience in safeguards, in physical protection and other technical aspects of the nonproliferation field.

It is also about sharing how we see the nuclear market evolving. Let me insist on that point: potential AREVA customers are not interested in enrichment or recycling facilities. They are interested in the generation of clean and affordable power. Why? Because the era of prestige is over: most countries have now entered an era of realism and efficiency. They have an equation to solve: how to generate X thousands MWh for 2020 or 2025 in a competitive, sustainable, and responsible way. And nuclear electricity generation is one of the solutions. You may wonder: and what if those countries ask for sensitive technology transfers? Well, the answer is simple: we won’t sell it!

Why do some countries seek nuclear weapons? National security, national power, prestige: their motivations are political. That is why apparent weapons programs have existed in some countries that have never produced a single KWh with nuclear generation – North Korea, Iraq, Iran come to mind.

The countries that come and see AREVA are not at all in this mindset. In fact, almost all countries we meet show zero interest in acquiring sensitive nuclear technology such as highly sophisticated uranium enrichment and/or used fuel treatment capability. As light water reactors such as AREVA’s EPR reactor by themselves do not present a proliferation risk, that’s why I am confident to say that the international growth of nuclear electricity generation does not equate to proliferation risk.